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Abstract  Marine reserves are gaining substantial public support as tools for
commercial fisheries management. Harvest sector responses will influence
policy performance, yet biological studies often depict harvester behavior as
spread uniformly over fishing grounds and unresponsive to economic opportuni-
ties. Previous bioeconomic analyses show that these behavioral assumptions are
inconsistent with empirical data and, more importantly, lead to overly optimistic
predictions about harvest gains from reserves. This paper adds another layer of
behavioral realism to the bioeconomics of marine reserves by endogenizing
fisher home port choices with a partial adjustment share model. Estimated with
Seemingly Unrelated Regression over monthly data, this approach allows simu-
lation of both short- and long-run behavioral response to changes induced by
marine reserve formation. The findings cast further doubt on the notion that ma-
rine reserves generate long-run harvest benefits.
Key words  Marine reserves, bioeconomics, seemingly unrelated regression,
fishing port.
JEL Classification Code Q22.
Introduction
In May of 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order that directed the De-
partments of the Interior and Commerce to develop plans for an extensive network
of marine protected areas in the coastal waters of the United States. The order was
in direct response to claims by many influential marine scientists that our most im-
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portant coastal ecosystems are potentially threatened by human actions, and that ma-
rine protected areas can preserve unique aquatic ecosystems and the
non-consumptive services that they provide for present and future generations. On a
deeper level, this order signals a fundamental change in marine policy that has the
potential to affect commercial fisheries around the US in a profound way. The order
explicitly acknowledges that marine resources are geographically diverse, as well as
spatially interdependent, and that successful management of these resources should
use spatially explicit tools. This distinctively spatial view of population dynamics
embodies an important transformation in ecological paradigms, away from an older
viewpoint that treats natural resources as uniformly distributed across space. Con-
temporary thinking emphasizes ongoing empirical findings about the patchiness and
spatial heterogeneity of resources. Some recent ecological studies of the marine en-
vironment adopt metapopulation models that depict marine resources as discrete and
heterogeneous patches of biomass that are linked through complex and variable
oceanographic processes (Quinn, Wing, and Botsford 1993; Botsford et al. 1999).
Although non-market values may be at the heart of conservationists’ support for
marine protected areas, fisheries scientists also suggest that carefully designed ma-
rine reserves could benefit fisheries. In particular, many biological models predict
potential harvest gains from managing with marine reserves (NRC 2001).1 Typically
these models simplify fishing behavior such that it is unresponsive to economic op-
portunities over time and space. Nevertheless, the possibility that biological benefits
of reserves could be generated without costs (or even with benefits) to fisheries is a
critical finding. The likelihood of anticipated fishery benefits may determine not
only the economic efficiency of using reserves, but also the political feasibility of
implementing them. The conventional wisdom in fisheries science is that there are
many cases in which these harvest benefits will materialize.
However, economic research on marine reserves challenges this conventional
wisdom in two crucial ways. First, the empirical economic literature on location
choice unequivocally demonstrates that fishing effort is responsive to economic op-
portunities over time and space. Most of this research applies discrete choice
modeling to target fishery choice (Bockstael and Opaluch 1983) or fishing ground
choice at the trip level (Eales and Wilen 1986; Dupont 1993; Larson, Sutton, and
Terry 1999; Curtis and Hicks 2000; Holland and Sutinen 2000; Mistiaen and Strand
2000; Smith 2002). Curtis and Hicks also calculate short-run welfare costs of closed
areas, while Smith jointly models fishing participation and location choice such that
total fishing effort and its spatial distribution are endogenous. Nonetheless, the lit-
erature on fishing grounds implicitly restricts the responsiveness of fishing effort by
conditioning on each vessel’s home fishing port. In this paper, we loosen this re-
striction by endogenizing fishing port.
Second, the conceptual and recent empirical bioeconomic literature on marine
reserves shows that models with endogenous fishing effort reach substantially dif-
ferent conclusions about marine reserves than ones with exogenous effort. In
contrast to purely biological models, conceptual bioeconomic studies of reserves
identify a fairly restrictive set of conditions under which reserves generate net har-
vest gains. Holland and Brazee (1996), fixing total fishing effort before and after the
policy change, show that joint harvest and conservation benefits are possible in the
steady state under some circumstances regarding the initial (pre-reserve) levels of
exploitation assumed. Reserves alone, however, do not address the underlying open-
1 The biological literature on marine reserves is voluminous. The NRC report summarizes the key find-
ings to date. For more detail, see Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2001); Smith (2001, 2004); and Smith
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access forces that lead to overexploitation (Hannesson 1998). With an open-access
model that allows for endogenous responses of fishing effort, Sanchirico and Wilen
(2001) show that reserves are most likely to increase total harvest when the pre-re-
serve fishery is severely overexploited.2 Taken together, empirical location choice
and conceptual bioeconomic studies suggest that since a reserve removes fishing op-
portunities, there will be some losses in the short run as fishermen are excluded
from the reserve area. Moreover, since fishermen are responsive to economic re-
turns, there will be some redistribution and possibly attrition in response to
diminished opportunities. These changes in effort will alter fishing mortality and dy-
namics in a metapopulation, which will then change expected economic
opportunities, and so on, in a complicated, dynamic, spatial process. The transition
of such a system to its long-run steady state is likely to involve an initial period of
losses, followed by recovery, and under some circumstances, a steady state with en-
hanced yields. Whether enhanced yields result is an empirical question, and
predicting the ultimate consequences of reserves ex ante requires empirical
bioeconomic modeling that tracks spatially explicit behavior.
Smith and Wilen (2003) bring empirical biological and economic spatial pro-
cesses together by linking a metapopulation model with a repeated nested logit
model of fishing location choice. They find that accounting for spatial behavior dra-
matically reduces the forecasted ability of marine reserves to actually enhance
fisheries production. In comparison to biological models that assume uniform and
unresponsive effort, their approach makes overall intensity of fishing effort and its
spatial distribution endogenous. The costs and payoffs from fishing in various
patches determine the pre- and post-reserve fishing effort distributions, which ulti-
mately affect the likelihood that reserves can increase overall harvest. Smith and
Wilen find dramatic differences between simulations that presume uniform and un-
responsive effort and those that allow for endogenous effort. Both the spatial
redistribution and the temporal attrition of effort reduce the set of circumstances un-
der which reserves generate net harvest gains. Smith and Wilen focus on the trip
level, taking trip origins as given. While this may suffice for short- and intermedi-
ate-term predictions of policy impacts, it misses additional important mechanisms
by which a fishery might respond to marine reserves. In particular, in many fisher-
ies, fishermen have the option to select home ports or ports of delivery. When
vessels move from port to port, the set of accessible fishing grounds changes. Alter-
natively, when marine reserves are enacted, the relative payoffs available to
fishermen based in different port locations will change, inducing further movement
between ports over the long term. This mechanism is important to the political
economy of reserves, since fishing communities and processing interests will likely
oppose policies that reduce secondary activities in regions.3 The primary contribu-
tion of this paper is to examine how robust the Smith and Wilen results are when
fishing ports are endogenous.
The next section discusses the fishery background, data, and relevant biology
for our case study of the northern California red sea urchin fishery. We also describe
the bioeconomic simulation model in Smith and Wilen (2003) and highlight how en-
dogenous fishing effort fits into the model. The following section develops and
2 While there are various modeling approaches, other papers in the economics literature also find that
whether or not reserves generate net harvest gains depends on biological and economic features of the
system (e.g., Brown and Roughgarden 1999; Conrad 1999; Pezzey, Roberts, and Urdal 2000; Anderson
2002).
3 This issue has been prominent in Alaska, for example, as processors and communities have fought
rights-based programs, such as ITQs, on the grounds that they would radically alter processing needs
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estimates a partial adjustment Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) port share
model and provides motivation for why port choice unfolds on a different time scale
from choice of fishing ground. We compute short- and long-run spatial effort elas-
ticities and characterize the additional responsiveness from modeling ports. Next,
we integrate the port adjustment model into the bioeconomic simulation model and
simulate short- and long-run impacts of marine reserves. The final section discusses
the results.
The Case Study—the Northern California Red Sea Urchin Fishery
The northern California red sea urchin fishery is an ideal case in which to analyze
marine reserves. First and foremost, urchin population dynamics are consistent with
the biological structure that is favorable for management with reserves. Urchins are
broadcast spawners and occur in “patches” or discrete subpopulations. The adults
are sedentary, but the subpopulations are connected through larval dispersal. This
means that heavily exploited populations may be able to rebuild when a reserve is
established, and the benefits may feed the remaining areas that are open to fishing.
In addition, biological returns to scale exist both in organism size and in density-
dependent reproduction.4
In California, individual divers harvest sea urchins for their roe on day trips.
Divers reach fishing grounds on 10–15 meter vessels. The vessels are small enough
that it is possible to load them on trailers and drive to an alternative fishing port.
Divers scrape urchins from rocky intertidal zones with hand-held rakes while
breathing through an air hose that is attached to an on-board air compressor. Divers
sell urchins dockside to processors located in various ports up and down the Califor-
nia coast. Freshness is extremely important for sea urchin roe, so whole urchins are
typically processed within a day, packed in special wooden trays, and immediately
flown to Japan.
The fishery is divided into northern and southern California partitions that are
separated by the sea otter conservation area in central California. California Depart-
ment of Fish and Game (CDFG) regulates the fishery with a combination of season
closures (individual days, weeks, and months), minimum size limits, and limited en-
try licensing, though they are also considering the use of marine reserves. CDFG
also maintains an extensive data set of logbook and landings ticket information that
includes individual diver records for fishing dates, fishing locations, fishing ports,
ex-vessel prices, and quantities caught.5
Although permit holders are free to move between northern and southern Cali-
fornia, and many of them have spent time in both parts of the fishery (Smith 2001),
we focus primarily on northern California because stock declines have been more
dramatic in that region. Divers land sea urchins at six ports in northern California.
From north to south, they are: Crescent City (CRC), Fort Bragg (FTB), Albion
4 As organism size increases, gamete production increases at an increasing rate. Thus, it may be benefi-
cial to fish some patches and allow urchins to grow large in other patches. Density-dependent reproduc-
tion provides a similar argument for reserves. Since urchins are broadcast spawners, harvesting one
sparsely populated area and allowing a reserve to become densely populated may produce more off-
spring (and harvest) than harvesting two moderately populated areas.
5 While the quality of logbook data is often an issue for commercial fisheries, the information for calcu-
lating port shares and expected port revenues comes from landings tickets that record actual sales. We,
thus, believe that our data are very high quality. For the fishing location choice model in Smith and
Wilen (2003), the key field used from logbook data is the location recorded in degrees and minutes of
latitude. We believe that the precision of latitude minutes, while sufficient for our analysis, is not so de-
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(ALB), Point Arena (PTA), Bodega (BOD), and Half Moon Bay (HMB). Given the
rugged coast of northern California and the rapid quality decay of fresh sea urchins,
these ports are really the only feasible alternatives for landing urchins.6 More than
90% of catch is landed at the four ports in the middle. Figure 1 shows the location
of these ports. Since divers make exclusively single-day trips, one can see immedi-
ately that a diver’s port ultimately limits the feasible set of possible fishing location
choices, in both the short and long run. Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of revenue
shares in each port over time.
The simulation model in Smith and Wilen (2003) captures dynamic and spatial
features of the sea urchin biological and oceanographic system, as well as spatial di-
mensions of the harvest sector. First, the process of building up a subpopulation
from an overharvested state may generate returns to scale in biological production
due to organism size or density-dependent spawning. Second, sinks and sources in
the dispersal of organisms may also generate returns to scale or exacerbate existing
ones, particularly when adult organisms are sedentary and only larvae disperse.
Third, there may be some ecological value of preserving a full, natural life cycle,
which a marine reserve can ensure. Combining these features requires a model with
multiple subpopulations that allows for larval dispersal and captures age- and size-struc-
ture within each subpopulation. Botsford et al. (1999) develop a metapopulation model
that captures all of these features, and Smith and Wilen (2003) and Wilen et al.
6 It may be physically possible to land sea urchins at ports in San Francisco, but this never occurs in our
data set. Most of the urchin fishing grounds are north of the peninsula, and the costs of mooring vessels
in the San Francisco Bay Area could be a factor.
Figure 1.  Northern California Sea Urchin PortsSmith and Wilen 90
(2002) adapt it to include economic behavior. While these papers describe the model
in detail, we briefly outline its analytical structure here.
In this model, the northern California red sea urchin fishery consists of 11 dis-
crete age- and size-structured subpopulations linked by a dispersal matrix. Each
separate subpopulation has a size structure described by a von Bertalanffy equation,
so that the size of an individual of age a in patch j is given by:
Size L e ja
j ka j
 , = ￿
- - () , 1  (1)
where a is a monthly time index from 1 to 360, and  Lj
￿ and kj are patch-specific
growth parameters. Populations are then aged by advancing the abundance values
for each month to the next older month so that Ai,a is a function of Ai,a–1, where A
denotes the number of organisms in the cohort. After the populations are aged, the
numbers surviving in the population are computed, along with the catch. A
Beverton-Holt mortality relationship determines survivors, which embeds both
patch-specific natural mortality rates, mj, as well as fishing mortality rates, fj, if the
size is above the minimum size limit, Llimit. We link the economic model of diver be-
havior to the population model by making monthly fishing mortality rates a function
of predicted diver trips. Accounting for both natural and fishing mortality, survival
of the number of individuals to age a + 1 becomes:
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Figure 2.  Northern California Sea Urchin Dockside RevenuesMarine Reserves with Endogenous Ports 91
and total catch (C) consists of the sum of harvests of all sizes greater than the mini-
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where w and b are allometric parameters relating weight and urchin test diameter.
These parameters essentially convert number of organisms of each size to an aggre-
gate measure of biomass, and harvest is a function of that biomass based on the
fishing mortality parameters fj. The allometric parameters give rise to the possibility
of an increasing returns production technology because b > 1 is the usual case,
which means that the second derivative of catch with respect to size is positive.
The metapopulation model also computes egg production, larval dispersal,
settlement, and survival. Egg production in the model ultimately determines how
many larvae are produced and is computed after survival has been calculated for





























This equation sums the egg production from each size class, where there is only
positive production for sizes greater than the size at reproductive maturity. The ex-
ponent on size (b) is greater than one, since egg production is increasing and convex
in organism size. Thus, the egg production relationship gives rise to another dimen-
sion of increasing returns production technology. For each month of the egg
production period, a fraction of egg production survives and disperses according to:
sD e in p = . (5)
This 11¥1 vector gives the array of settlement associated with the array of egg pro-
duction from the system, modified by the survival probability, p, and distributed by
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To  complete the bioeconomic model, fishing behavior is linked to the
metapopulation model by endogenizing the fishing mortality coefficients. Predicted trips
are converted to time- and location-specific fishing coefficients, fjt, by the following:
fy h q jt jt = (), (7)
7 Total larvae, in turn, can be thought of as a measure of the biological system’s resilience to environ-
mental or harvesting shocks. Since patches are connected through larval dispersal, as long as there is
high egg production in the system, heavily exploited areas can be repopulated.Smith and Wilen 92
where yjt is trips to location j at time t, h is hours per trip (assumed constant in our
simulations), and q is a catchability coefficient (to be calibrated to the actual fishing
data).8 Combined with an assumed price of $1 per pound, these fishing mortalities
are fed back into the model to predict expected revenues and yjt in the next period.
The total predicted trips (y) in each location j in month t is the number of divers
in each port (dp) times the probability of visiting the patch from that port at t (ppjt)
multiplied by the number of choice occasions in that month (ot):9








The Smith and Wilen (2003) model estimates ppjt using repeated nested logit but as-
sumes that the total number of active divers and the distribution of these divers
across ports will not change over the course of time. The key difference between the
model with and without port switching is that the model with port switching com-
putes the endogenous dp’s in equation (8). Thus, our empirical focus in this paper is
on how to endogenize the dp’s.
Spatial Choice over the Short and Long Run — Modeling Two Time Scales
Previous econometric work on urchin diver behavior focuses on a detailed depiction
of the participation and fishing location choices (Smith 2002; Smith and Wilen
2003; Wilen et al. 2002), using a repeated nested logit model to analyze daily fish-
ing decisions. For each fishing day, a diver chooses whether or not to go fishing. If
he fishes, he also chooses where to fish from a set of discrete fishing locations,
which we denote as patches to be consistent with the metapopulation literature. In
all of this analysis, a longer travel distance from a particular port reduces the prob-
ability of visiting a patch, and a higher patch-level revenue increases the probability
of visiting a patch. With this nesting structure, higher revenues also increase the
overall level of participation.
All of the individual choice models estimated in previous work are conditional
on the port of origin of each diver. This implies that a diver’s home port determines
the travel distances to the portfolio of patch options available to him/her. But when
economic and biological policies change, we would also expect that the relative at-
traction of locating in a particular port would change. So in the long run, we would
anticipate that divers could choose port location, as well as make daily participation
8 The actual number of dive hours per trip exhibits considerable heterogeneity in sample, but attempts to
explain it have not been successful. It appears to be random, and we assume that averaging across indi-
viduals is an appropriate proxy. One specific analysis that is undertaken is to see if hours per trip can be
explained by travel distance. The idea is that larger travel distances allow less time for diving. The R2
value is 0.0017. A statistically significant relationship is found, but it is quantitatively insignificant. The
marginal decrease in hours per trip for a 69 mile travel distance was .013. That converts to about one
second less diving for one mile of extra travel. There is rounding in the hours reported, which introduces
some error in this measure of effort. However, there is no reason to believe that it would bias results in
one direction or the other, or for that matter, that it would be correlated with travel distance. The most
likely explanation for this result is simply that diving is physically tiring, and individuals on a trip do
not exceed a certain dive length. In that sense, travel time and dive times are separate decisions.
9 The choice occasions for a given month are determined by the season closure regulations. For northern
California, all of July is closed. In June and August, the season is three days per week but closed one
week each month. In May and September, the season is four days per week but closed one week each
month. In April and October, the season is four days per week, and the rest of the year, all days are
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and patch-choice decisions from each port. Port choice is a different type of discrete
decision than participation and location choice, however. For the latter, the time step
is naturally a daily one. Is it worth fishing today or not? If so, is it better to go to
patch 1 or patch 2, etc.? Though port choices are also discrete decisions, it is not
realistic to apply a daily time step to these decisions.
Port switching realistically involves a longer time step for two reasons. First, it
is clearly infeasible to switch ports every day, particularly if a diver switches from a
port in southern California to one in northern California. Second, switching ports
entails lumpy costs, including the potentially very significant cost of moving one’s
home and family. In general, we would expect an individual to switch ports if the
discounted expected return differential (comparing the new location to the old loca-
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where m and l index ports, m˘l indicates moving from m to l, r is the discount fac-
tor, p is net rents in a location, and c is switching cost.10 Note that costs and
revenues are subscripted by i to denote individual-specific values. One would expect
that switching costs are heterogeneous across the population of harvesters for a vari-
ety of reasons. Some individuals have families, while others do not. Divers likely
have heterogeneous economic opportunities outside the fishery. What we observe in
the data actually suggests that expected revenue streams are also heterogeneous
across individuals. Specifically, there are days in which at least one individual
switches from port A to port B, while another individual switches from port B to
port A.11 Assuming that switching costs are positive, it must be that the expected
revenue streams for these two individuals are different.
Because switching costs are lumpy and rent differentials may be transitory, we
expect that port shares will respond sluggishly to contemporaneous rent differentials
across space. Beyond personal considerations, such as family, there are several other
reasons for lumpy switching costs. One possibility is long-term contracts for moor-
ing a vessel. Another explanation is contractual relationships between a diver and a
processor. Although we do not observe long-term diver-processor contracts in our
data set, long-term informal relationships between divers and processors exist
whereby divers have persistent long-term relationships with particular processors/
dealers.12 Thus, a contemporaneous rent differential is not necessarily enough for an
individual to change ports. If the rent differential persists or widens over time, the
expected rent differential stream would grow and eventually lead to a switch.
A partial adjustment model is one way to model sluggish adjustment empiri-
10 Throughout this paper, we assume that individual divers are price takers. Though we do not test this
assumption, we note that there are over 500 individual urchin divers that participate in the fishery over
the period of our sample.
11 For instance, on 11/17/88 one diver switched from Albion to Fort Bragg, while another diver switched
from Fort Bragg to Albion. Similarly, on 9/1/91 one diver switched from Bodega to Point Arena, while
four divers switched from Point Arena to Bodega.
12 One indication of these long-term relationships is the share of business that an individual diver does
with the dealer to whom he most often sells his catch. There are 275 divers with a least 25 dives in
northern California. For each diver, we identify the top-ranked dealer as the dealer that the diver sells to
the most number of times. On average, these divers sell a share of 0.545 of their landings to each diver’s
top-ranked dealer. The standard deviation is 0.204. Expanding the set of divers to ones with at least 10
dives in northern California, the mean and standard deviation are 0.606 and 0.235, respectively. Thus,
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cally.13 In this setting, the target share, s*, of divers in each port (m = 1, …, M) is a
function of the expected net rents (P) in each port and parameters (q). Following the
treatment in Greene (1993), we have:
sf,..., ,..., m M mt
m
tM t mm M
* (; ), , ..., , == PP 11 1 qq (10)
or in matrix form:
sf tt
* (;) . =P Q  (11)
Actual share adjusts to the difference between the current period’s target share
and the previous period’s actual share.14 Assuming an additive error term, this leads
to the following:
ss ss m M mt mt mt mt mt -= - - + = -- 11 11 () () ,, ..., . * le (12)
Substituting equation (10) into (12) produces the autoregressive form of the model:
ss f ,..., ,..., mt mt
m
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Implicitly, this model averages over the heterogeneity that exists across individuals
in both their assessments of rent differentials and in their lumpy switching costs.
Empirically, we do not observe actual expected net rents across space and time.
We assume that expected revenues are an adequate proxy for rents because the two
measures are highly correlated.15 Fixed costs that vary across space do not vary
across time because they partly involve features of the coastal geography, and vari-
able costs that do change over time are likely to be correlated across space (e.g., fuel
costs and wages in other fisheries). Thus, changes in revenues likely capture
changes in rents across space and time. Suppose that the forcing equation in (13) is
a function of revenues that is linear in parameters:
13 We do not attempt to model individual expectations, nor do we model forward-looking behavior. In
some sense, partial adjustment is a reduced-form model of the economic dynamics. Partial adjustment is
also difficult to distinguish econometrically from adaptive expectations, which provides one expecta-
tions-based explanation for the dynamics that we see. Nevertheless, we argue that this model is justified
because lumpy switching costs are the most important feature of port dynamics.
14 Though a rent equilibrium in this fishery is a complex bioeconomic phenomenon, the share model pre-
sumes simply that past rents carry the relevant information for port choice and that the fleet essentially
makes sequentially myopic decisions. A reviewer points out that a Lucas Critique may apply to the
policy simulations later in the paper. We agree that this is a valid concern, but argue that the benefits of
our approach outweigh the drawbacks. First, in spite of existing regulations, some degree of open access
forces persists in the urchin fishery. Thus, individuals cannot fully appropriate gains from forward-look-
ing actions—particularly from restricting their own harvests—and it is reasonable to assume some form
of sequentially myopic decision making. Second, some simplification of the economic dynamics is nec-
essary because a fully structural forward-looking model with spatial biological features is simply intrac-
table. Finally, even if a fully structural metapopulation econometric model were tractable, it is unreason-
able to assume that individual fishermen have this level of knowledge of the biological system. Most of
our biological parameters are not estimated from the fishing data, but instead come from a large set of
independent biological and oceanographic studies.
15 For the estimations below, we assume that expected revenues are backward-looking monthly averages
in the port. This is consistent with the monthly averages by patch in Smith and Wilen (2003) and allows
for a monthly time step in the bioeconomic simulations. Given that the simulation model is determinis-
tic, a steady state is approached when revenues in each patch (and therefore in each port) are in equilib-
rium long enough to bring target and actual shares in alignment.Marine Reserves with Endogenous Ports 95
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The a’s account for non-fishery benefits of being at a particular port that do not
change over time. Note that it is still possible to estimate the model as linear in the
parameters but to nonlinearly transform the data. As such, a function g(.) is included
in equation (14), since the relationship between shares and revenues does not have a
definitive curvature a priori. The function f m(.) in equation (14) leads to a system of
M equations with each equation defined by:
ssg R mt m mt mk kt
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The virtues of this model are that it can be estimated in a manner consistent with the
partial adjustment model, above, and one can impose restrictions such that the long-
run expected shares sum to one. The economic content of the model is preserved in
that shares respond unambiguously to revenue changes across space and time.16 The
full model of choice with port switching is depicted in figure 3. For simplicity, we
depict only two ports in northern California and three patches. The patch choices
closest to the relevant port are in bold. Divers in each port are assumed to make fine
Figure 3.  Urchin Diver Decision Tree
16 The main drawback is that the model can predict individual shares outside the unit interval. Since we
can impose that they sum to one in the long run, the practical significance of this problem is that nega-
tive shares can be predicted. In the event of a negative share, one would have to make an ad hoc adjust-
ment to the predicted shares used in the bioeconomic simulation model.Smith and Wilen 96
time scale decisions (daily) about whether to fish and, if so, where. On a coarser
time scale (monthly) divers also make decisions about whether to switch to different
ports within northern California, and also about whether to locate and fish in north-
ern or southern California.
Because there is substantial geographic separation between the northern and
southern California fisheries, we estimate port shares in a two-step process. First,
divers are allocated between northern and southern California with one partial ad-
justment model. Then, a separate set of equations is estimated to allocate northern
California divers to the different northern California ports. This nesting permits the
speed of adjustment to differ for decisions about switching ports within northern
California and decisions about switching from (to) northern to (from) southern Cali-
fornia. For the south/north share equation, expected revenues are computed by
averaging actual lagged revenues across all ports.
Before turning to restrictions on the linear model, it is worthwhile to explore the
functional form for the expected revenue terms. To this end, Box-Cox transforma-
tions are run on each port equation. Thus, for each equation in (15), a parameter h is











Based on the Box-Cox estimations,17 we proceed with the following functional form
for the partial adjustment model:
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There are essentially two systems to estimate: one for the north/south switching
and one for the switching within the north. One immediate restriction that we might
impose is that the speed of adjustment is the same within each system (but not nec-
essarily across systems). This suggests that the inertia against switching ports is the
same for similar decisions. In general, we expect that north/south switching must
overcome more inertia than switching within the north because the former decision
is more costly.18 A second type of restriction is based on the idea that marginal ef-
fects of revenues must add up across equations. When revenues go up in one port,
ceteris paribus, we expect an increase in that port’s share. This increase must come
from other ports, since we model the region decision and the port decision within a
region as recursive. Thus, a share increase from a 1% increase in revenue must equal
17 One can then test h against different values. For instance, if the null hypothesis of h=1 is not rejected,
then the model is linear in variables. Alternatively, if the null hypothesis of h=0 is not rejected, then the
model is linear in the natural logs of the variables. There are seven total equations, one for the north/
south share and six northern port share equations. We estimate these models separately before proceed-
ing to model the system. Due to multicollinearity combined with the highly nonlinear nature of the Box-
Cox transform, four models are singular. However, for the three models that do converge without
singularities, we fail to reject the hypothesis of h = 0. These models are Albion, Bodega, and Crescent
City. The t-statistics are –1.23, 0.75, and 0.24, respectively.
18 By restricting speed-of-adjustment parameters within each system, it is possible to impose adding up
restrictions in a linear manner. Similarly, it is also possible to impose a linear restriction that long-run
expected shares sum to one. Although we believe that this is a priori justification for this restriction, we
also test the restriction for the northern California system. The test statistic is 0.3527 and is distributed
F4,515. The critical value is 2.39. Thus, we fail to reject the restriction of same adjustment parameter
within the northern California system.Marine Reserves with Endogenous Ports 97









where m indexes across ports and k is the index for each expected revenue term.
These restrictions identify the model such that one equation must be dropped from
each system.19
Share Model Estimation: Between Northern and Southern California
We  estimate the north/south switching model on a monthly time step using data
from 1988–98. The total sample size of 111 represents a 130-month sample period,
subtracting 18 months of season closures, and dropping the first month to initialize
the lagged share variable. Table 1 summarizes the results. All coefficients have their
expected signs, and l lies in the unit interval. The interpretation of the revenue coef-
ficients is simply that the share of divers in southern California increases in
response to expected revenues in that region and decreases in response to expected
revenues in northern California. Interestingly, the expected revenue coefficients are
very similar in magnitude. We test that these coefficients are the same using an F
test. The test statistic is 0.0446, the critical value (for 5% confidence) is 3.93. Thus,
we fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same. Combined with the
cross-equation restrictions, this suggests that the southern California share increase
from a 1% increase in RSOC is the same as the northern California share increase
from a 1% increase in RNOC.
Another noteworthy aspect of these results is that the estimated l — 0.86 — is
close to one. In a partial adjustment model, a l of zero implies instantaneous adjust-
ment. As l approaches one, the speed of adjustment is slower. That is, in this model
the optimal shares of divers in northern and southern California respond slowly to
structural changes in the relative profitability of diving in these regions. This result
is not surprising given the geographic separation of the regions.
19 For the north/south switching model, this means that there is just one equation to estimate. The reason
is that there are six total parameters, three restrictions, and the dependent variables always sum to one.
Hence, not dropping an equation creates a singularity in the covariance matrix.
Table 1
South/North Switching OLS Model of Port Shares
Variable Parameter Coefficient t-statistic
Constant a 0.028061 0.151
Lagged SOC Share l 0.861212 17.242**
ln(RSOC) gSOC 0.056192 1.6678*
ln(RNOC) gNOC –0.050767 –1.908*
R2 0.8231
N 111
Notes: ** indicates significant at the 5% level and * indicates significant at the 10% level.Smith and Wilen 98
Share Model Estimation: Within Northern California
In northern California, there are six ports, and the dependent variable is the share of
northern California divers. There are six equations, forty-eight parameters, five re-
strictions on l, and six restrictions on the g’s. Now suppose that all revenues are the
same across ports. We expect that the revenue terms within an equation might offset
each other, but that real differences in opportunities across ports persist. For the
long-run expected shares to sum to one when revenue effects are offsetting, the fol-















which can be rewritten as a linear restriction on the a’s and l. By dropping one
equation, we can estimate the parameters using SUR. The virtue of SUR in this set-
ting is two-fold: it permits easy implementation of cross-equation restrictions, and it
is efficient relative to individual Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations because
it allows for contemporaneous correlation. The parameters for the dropped equation
can be recovered from the restrictions on the g’s, the l’s, and the a’s.
Table 2 contains the SUR results for HMB, BOD, PTA, ALB, and FTB along
with the recovered parameters for CRC.20 Note first that the estimated l is much
smaller than the l from the north/south system, implying that the speed of adjust-
ment is much faster within the northern California system than between the northern
and California systems. It is much less costly to switch from, say, Fort Bragg to
Albion than to switch from Fort Bragg to southern California. The implication is
that port shares within northern California respond more quickly to structural
changes in expected revenues.
For the most part, the expected revenue coefficients are in accordance with our
prior beliefs. Of the five estimated own-revenue coefficients, three are positive and
statistically significant, one is positive and not significant, and the other is negative
and not significant. Many of the off-diagonal revenue coefficients are negative, and
some are statistically significant. Only two of the off-diagonal coefficients have the
wrong (i.e., positive) sign and are statistically significant (gBOD,FTB and gALB,CRC).
These aberrations are likely the result of multicollinearity in the expected revenue
terms. Overall, in spite of the CRC expected revenue coefficient, the ALB model ap-
pears to work best. The intercept and own-revenue coefficients are positive and
significant, two neighboring revenue coefficients are negative and significant, a rev-
enue coefficient two ports away is also negative and significant, and a revenue
coefficient three ports away is negative though not significant.21
20 All estimates were obtained using the SYSLIN procedure in SAS and imposing the relevant cross-
equation restrictions.
21 The SUR model for northern California also appears to work well for predicting shares. By construc-
tion, the shares sum to one. For BOD, PTA, ALB, and FTB, the predicted shares are always in the unit
interval. The HMB predicted share is positive on 106 occasions out of 111. The CRC predicted share is
positive on 94 occasions out of 111. The minimum predicted share for either port is –0.0048, so there is
little practical significance in adjusting port shares in the simulation model when a negative prediction
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Table 2
SUR Results for Northern California Port Switching
Variable Parameter Coefficient t-statistic
Diver share for:
Half Moon Bay
Constant aHMB 0.036008 0.71
Lagged HMB Share g 0.436385 10.37**
ln(RHMB) gHMB,HMB 0.009295 2.29**
ln(RBOD) gHMB,BOD –0.011418 –1.13
ln(RPTA) gHMB,PTA –0.001983 –0.24
ln(RALB) gHMB,ALB 0.00211 0.16
ln(RFTB) gHMB,FTB –0.006573 –0.57
ln(RCRC) gHMB,CRC 0.006441 1.40
Bodega
Constant aHMB –0.588058 –4.38**
Lagged BOD Share l 0.436385 —restricted—
ln(RHMB) gBOD,HMB 0.005392 0.50
ln(RBOD) gBOD,BOD 0.020226 0.76
ln(RPTA) gBOD,PTA 0.038562 1.79*
ln(RALB) gBOD,ALB –0.093301 –2.71**
ln(RFTB) gBOD,FTB 0.143569 4.69**
ln(RCRC) gBOD,CRC –0.00833 –0.69
Point Arena
Constant aPTA 0.524777 2.60**
Lagged PTA Share g 0.436385 —restricted—
ln(RHMB) gPTA,HMB –0.0183 –1.15
ln(RBOD) gPTA,BOD –0.001566 –0.04
ln(RPTA) gPTA,PTA 0.068064 2.13**
ln(RALB) gPTA,ALB –0.065888 –1.29
ln(RFTB) gPTA,FTB –0.05216 –1.14
ln(RCRC) gPTA,CRC 0.000851 0.05
Albion
Constant aALB 0.424906 2.99**
Lagged ALB Share g 0.436385 —restricted—
ln(RHMB) gALB,HMB –0.013528 –1.19
ln(RBOD) gALB,BOD –0.056048 –2.00**
ln(RPTA) gALB,PTA –0.043831 –1.93*
ln(RALB) gALB,ALB 0.103488 2.86**
ln(RFTB) gALB,FTB –0.067638 –2.10**
ln(RCRC) gALB,CRC 0.033086 2.56**
Fort Bragg
Constant aFTB 0.15705 0.77
Lagged FTB Share g 0.436385 —restricted—
ln(RHMB) gFTB,HMB 0.019082 1.17
ln(RBOD) gFTB,BOD 0.048374 1.17
ln(RPTA) gFTB,PTA –0.064931 –1.99**
ln(RALB) gFTB,ALB 0.047362 0.90
ln(RFTB) gFTB,FTB –0.011484 –0.25
ln(RCRC) gFTB,CRC –0.027462 –1.48
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Spatial Fishing Effort and Marine Reserve Simulations
In this section, we adapt the empirical results from the previous section to the inte-
grated bioeconomic simulation model. We compare the economic responsiveness of
urchin divers when port switching is modeled to the economic responsiveness when
just daily participation and fishing location choice are modeled. To this end, we first
derive and compare effort elasticities with port switching to effort elasticities that
account only for trip-level spatial decisions based on the Smith and Wilen (2003) re-
peated nested logit model. We then simulate marine reserve outcomes.22
Fishing Effort Elasticities
We ultimately measure fishing effort at the patch level. How does patch-level effort
respond to an increase in patch-specific revenue? To answer this question, we com-
pute elasticities for trips to different patches with respect to changes in revenues
under different assumptions about spatial mobility. The computed elasticities tell us
the percentage change in fishing pressure at a given location in response to a 1% in-
crease in expected revenues in that location. Adding the possibility of port switching
over a longer time scale permits us to distinguish between short-run and long-run
elasticities, which to our knowledge has never been done in models of fishing loca-
Table 2
SUR Results for Northern California Port Switching (Continued)
Variable Parameter Coefficient t-statistic
Diver share for:
Crescent City
Constant aCRC 0.008932 —recovered—
Lagged CRC Share g 0.436385 —recovered—
ln(RHMB) gCRC,HMB –0.001941 —recovered—
ln(RBOD) gCRC,BOD 0.000432 —recovered—
ln(RPTA) gCRC,PTA 0.004119 —recovered—
ln(RALB) gCRC,ALB 0.006229 —recovered—
ln(RFTB) gCRC,FTB –0.005714 —recovered—
ln(RCRC) gCRC,CRC –0.004586 —recovered—
R2 (system weighted) 0.357
n 555
Notes: ** indicates significant at the 5% level and * indicates significant at the 10% level.
22 Results from the repeated nested logit estimation are in Smith and Wilen (2003). To summarize, the
model includes over 400,000 individual choice occasions. The set of participation choices is constructed
based on the actual active divers on each day and netting out the partial season closures. Variables af-
fecting participation alone include a dummy (for Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) and three weather indi-
cators (wave height, wave period, and wind speed). Variables that influence location choice include
travel distance (from port to patch) and patch-specific expected revenues (backward-looking monthly
averages in the patch for the entire fleet). The nested logit inclusive value coefficient folds the location
branch back into the participation decision. As such, an increase in patch-specific expected revenues (or
a decrease in distance, which would be the case in the event of a port switch) also increases overall par-
ticipation. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.Marine Reserves with Endogenous Ports 101
tion choice. When revenues in a patch increase (or decrease), there are four avenues
through which effort in that patch responds. First, an increase in revenue makes the
patch more favorable relative to other patches and draws effort in from other
patches. Second, an increase in revenues also makes fishing participation overall
more profitable and increases average participation. Some of this increase is allo-
cated to the patch. Third, a revenue increase makes choosing the port nearby more
attractive relative to others and leads to some short-run port switching. Finally, the
sluggish responses in port switching draw even more divers over the long run to the
port and the nearby patches when revenue in one patch increases.
To operationalize elasticities and the simulation model, we make several simplify-
ing assumptions. First, we reduce the model to one with just the four main northern
California ports. Second, we note that port choice only affects travel distances to
patches, and all other variables that influence choice probabilities are the same
across different individuals. Thus, the stratification of choice probabilities in the
simulation model is done only in one dimension. Third, we must assume something
about the total number of urchin divers across northern and southern California.
Substantial entry and exit behavior takes place over the period during which we
must calibrate the simulation model. To handle this changing total number of divers,
we stop and restart the simulation model several times, changing the default total num-
ber of divers to match closely the actual number of participants in the fishery. Once we
are past the sample period, we do not know how many active divers will be in the fish-
ery. However, the limited entry program includes a mechanism that will steer the
long-run diver count to a target level of 300. Thus, to simulate out-of-sample, we as-
sume that the long-run number of harvesters approaches the limited entry target of 300.23
Given the assumptions above, the first step is to predict the total number of divers in
northern California. With the limited entry program, there are approximately 300 total
divers in the fishery in the long run in both northern and southern California.24 We allo-
cate the 300 divers between northern and southern California using the results of the
regression in table 1 and fixing southern California revenues.25 Since we fail to reject the
hypothesis that gNOC = –gSOC, we use a single revenue parameter here.
We next allocate predicted northern California divers among the northern Cali-
fornia ports using a stylized version of the regression results in table 2.26 The
23 By allowing share of northern California divers to adjust, divers harvesting from the northern Califor-
nia metapopulation is effectively endogenous.
24 Average participation rates do not change substantially over the sample period, which justifies the 300-
diver long-run assumption. For the calibration of the simulation model, we use actual number of divers be-
cause there were substantially more participants in the fishery going through a period of attrition. Though it
is possible that the total active divers could drop below 300, the assumption is that decreases in profitability
and the subsequent decreases in participation in the nested logit model would mimic this attrition.
25 This approach is evaluated over the sample period using the mean southern California revenue per trip
and predicted and actual southern California shares in the lagged share variable. Both methods track the
share trends. Using actual shares rather than predicted does a better job, of course, but using predicted
shares only misses the seasonality of the process.
26 The reason that the model is stylized is twofold. First, although the port selection model is estimated
over six ports and includes Half Moon Bay and Crescent City, the focus here is only on the four main
ports of northern California. This is done for simplicity and to reduce the dimensionality of the model,
but it is also justified because Half Moon Bay has limited activity and is separated from the rest of the
fishery by most of the San Francisco Bay Area. Crescent City has even less fishing activity and is ex-
tremely far from the next nearest port. Moreover, activity in Crescent City, if linked to another fishing
port for sea urchin, may be linked more closely to the sea urchin fishery in Oregon. Second, the model is
stylized because not all of the port selection regression results are economically sensible. In particular,
some of the off-diagonal coefficient signs are opposite of what we expect, possibly due to severe
multicollinearity. The components of these revenues are correlated as well. Prices are highly correlated,
presumably as a result of market integration, and catch per trip variables are correlated as a result of
long-term downward pressures on the urchin stocks across the entire region.Smith and Wilen 102
stylized model includes one speed of adjustment parameter (lnorth), one constant set
equal across ports (anorth), and one diagonal or own-revenue adjustment parameter
(gnorth) in conjunction with symmetric off-diagonals for the substitute ports. The
simulated northern California port shares are then:
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We impose the following restriction to match the restrictions in equation (19):
41 al north north += . (21)
Table 3 summarizes the results of own-revenue elasticities at three different rev-
enue levels because the discrete adjustment elasticities are functions of the data. The
Appendix explains the calculations. Elasticity 1 and Elasticity 2 in table 3 contain,
respectively, short- and long-run elasticities for the port switching model assuming
that there is no adjustment at the patch level. That is, they take patch choice prob-
abilities as given. All locations are inelastic with respect to own patch-specific
revenues. This is not surprising given the infrequency of diver port switches. More-
over, trips are inevitably less elastic with respect to own patch revenues than with
respect to port average revenues, because port average revenues are comprised of
multiple patches. The pattern of elasticities also suggests that edge patches are more
elastic. The reason is that much of diver spatial adjustment in the interior patches
can take place without moving from one port to another. On the outer patches, this is
less true.-
In the short and long run, revenue increases within a patch draw more effort
from other ports and from southern California. The long-run elasticities are com-
posed of short-run effects modified by the two different adjustment parameters.
Recall that adjustment is far more rapid within northern California than between
northern and southern California. The ratio of long-run to short-run elasticities re-
flects equations (A3) and (A4) in the Appendix. This ratio is between [1/(1–lsouth)]
and [1/(1–lnorth)]. Neither set of elasticities changes in response to scaling revenues
up or down because equation (20) is linear in logarithms; i.e., the revenue terms
cancel from the elasticity calculations.
Columns 3 through 5 contain elasticities that allow for discrete patch adjust-
ment. Frequently visited patches are less elastic than infrequently visited patches. It
is also worth noting that the elasticities become larger as mean revenues increase.
Column 4 combines discrete adjustment with short-run port adjustment, and column
5 combines discrete adjustment with long-run port adjustment. Overall, the magni-
tudes from patch adjustment are greater than those from port adjustment. The main
lesson from these computed elasticities is that in the short run, effort responsiveness
to revenue changes is relatively small for port decisions, whereas in the long run it
is reasonably large. Short-run effort responsiveness is inelastic, averaging in the
0.1–0.2 range, whereas long-run responsiveness is less inelastic. When combined
with discrete response, long-run elasticities are in the 1.0–2.6 range.Marine Reserves with Endogenous Ports 103
Table 3
Elasticities With and Without Port Model Trips
to Patch j with Respect to Revenues in Patch j
Patch Elast. 1 Elast. 2 Elast. 3 Elast. 4 Elast. 5
Mean Revenues
Farallons 0.251 0.508 2.076 2.328 2.584
1 0.098 0.197 0.807 0.904 1.004
2 0.207 0.457 1.607 1.814 2.064
3 0.017 0.068 1.520 1.537 1.588
4 0.126 0.301 1.483 1.608 1.784
50 .119 0.271 1.066 1.186 1.337
6 0.057 0.127 0.974 1.031 1.101
7 0.111 0.239 0.775 0.886 1.014
8 0.090 0.178 0.699 0.788 0.876
9 0.122 0.241 0.983 1.104 1.223
10 0.233 0.461 1.895 2.127 2.355
1.5 x Mean Revenues
Farallons 0.251 0.508 3.114 3.366 3.622
1 0.098 0.197 1.210 1.308 1.408
2 0.207 0.457 2.410 2.617 2.867
3 0.017 0.068 2.279 2.297 2.347
4 0.126 0.301 2.224 2.350 2.525
50 .119 0.271 1.600 1.719 1.871
6 0.057 0.127 1.461 1.518 1.588
7 0.111 0.239 1.162 1.274 1.401
8 0.090 0.178 1.048 1.138 1.226
9 0.122 0.241 1.474 1.596 1.715
10 0.233 0.461 2.842 3.075 3.303
0.5 x Mean Revenues
Farallons 0.251 0.508 1.038 1.290 1.546
1 0.098 0.197 0.403 0.501 0.601
2 0.207 0.457 0.803 1.011 1.260
3 0.017 0.068 0.760 0.777 0.828
4 0.126 0.301 0.741 0.867 1.042
50 .119 0.271 0.533 0.653 0.804
6 0.057 0.127 0.487 0.544 0.614
7 0.111 0.239 0.387 0.499 0.626
8 0.090 0.178 0.349 0.439 0.527
9 0.122 0.241 0.491 0.613 0.732
10 0.233 0.461 0.947 1.180 1.408
Elasticity Definitions:
1) Short-run elasticity with no discrete adjustment.
2) Long-run elasticity with no discrete adjustment.
3) Elasticity with no port adjustment (short- and long-run are the same).
4) Short-run elasticity with both port and discrete adjustment.
5) Long-run elasticity with both port and discrete adjustment.Smith and Wilen 104
Simulation Results With Port Switching
We simulate the effects of creating a reserve in patch 8, a heavily fished patch.27 We
chose a heavily fished patch following the results in Sanchirico and Wilen (2001),
which suggest that reserves are most likely to generate harvest increases when they
are implemented in heavily exploited patches. Table 4 compares results of the simu-
lation model with and without port switching. The first two lines repeat the results
from Smith and Wilen (2003, table 4) and add projected trips per year for each
diver; i.e., a measure of per capita participation. These participation rates for the
model without port switching approximately match actual participation of 26.52 per
capita trips in 1996 for northern California.
By introducing port switching, the steady-state diver count in northern Califor-
nia is predicted to decline dramatically from what we observe towards the end of
our sample period. There are two driving forces of this predicted trend. The first is
that the total number of divers is assumed to decrease from approximately 400 at the
end of the sample period to the limited entry target level of 300 in the steady state.
But this 25% reduction clearly cannot explain the entire difference between 131 and
33 divers. The second driving force is the evolution of state variables in northern
California. As the simulation model proceeds beyond the sample period, continued
fishing pressure reduces abundance and, therefore, revenue per trip. By fixing catch
per trip in southern California, increased pressure on the northern California re-
source ultimately leads to divers switching to southern California.
The switching behavior within northern California serves to reinforce the evolu-
tion of state variables, and thus, the prediction of a smaller number of total divers in
the north. If some patches have high abundance but are difficult to reach from ports
27 Patch 8 is illustrative, but the results using other heavily fished patches are consistent with the results
reported here (Smith 2001).
Table 4
Economics of Marine Reserves with Port Switching
The Northern California Red Sea Urchin Fishery
Steady-State Trips Steady-State Steady-State Discounted*
N. California per Diver Harvest Egg Production Revenues
Divers per Year (1,000 lbs.) (billions) ($1,000)
Discrete Choice Only (a = 0.005)
No Closure 131 29.9 830 1,316 17,440
Close Patch 8 131 25.3 752 1,441 15,074
Port Choice and Discrete Choice (a = 0.005)
No Closure 33 57.8 638 1,627 13,400
Close Patch 8 36 47.2 576 1,692 11,660
Port Choice and Discrete Choice (a = 0.005)  50% Decrease in S. Cal. Revenues
No Closure 83 37.9 802 1,399 16,846
Close Patch 8 89 31.2 728 1,495 14,683
* Uses a 5% constant discount rate and assumes $1 per pound of sea urchin.Marine Reserves with Endogenous Ports 105
that have the most divers, in the model without port switching there is a limited amount
of adjustment that will take advantage of these opportunities. High abundance patches
are predicted to persist without port switching because there is a fixed small number of
divers with reasonable access to these locations. In contrast, with port switching, divers
are predicted to relocate to ports near high abundance areas and put greater pressure on
the resource in those areas. Eventually, this behavior lowers the average abundance
in northern California and decreases the overall attractiveness of the region.
Across all three sets of simulations, the per capita trip count decreases when a
reserve is introduced. The reason is straightforward. A reserve in patch 8, a heavily
fished location, decreases the inclusive value in the nested logit model and decreases the
overall attractiveness of participating. In the long run, the benefits from reserve creation
are not enough to offset the loss of this fishing alternative, so overall profitability of
fishing is lower. The long-run consequence of port switching in this model is reduced
aggregate harvesting pressure on the northern California resource. As a result, egg pro-
duction is considerably higher than in the simulations without port switching. However,
the total harvest and discounted revenue predictions are also lower. This suggests
that the system as a whole in the steady state is more lightly exploited than the ex-
ploitation level corresponding to the system-wide maximum sustainable yield.
The extreme predicted decline of northern California divers in the port switch-
ing model is partly an artifact of the assumption of fixed southern California
revenues. At the outset, this assumption seems reasonable because southern California
catch per trip appears stable in the sample period, especially in comparison to northern
California catch per trip. This suggests that southern California is already near a har-
vested steady state.28 However, a major influx of northern California divers would
decrease abundances in southern California. To assess this possibility, simulations are
run with a 50% decrease in southern California catch per trip and hence, revenues.
Clearly, the reduction in southern California revenues supports corresponding
increased fishing pressure on the northern California resource, as indicated by de-
creased egg production. There is also a dramatic increase in number of divers in the
north, although the results of the 50% reduction still do not lead to a steady-state
harvest that is as large as the model without port switching.
In all cases, with and without port switches, a marine reserve in patch 8 reduces
discounted revenues and steady-state harvest but increases egg production. The dis-
counted present value revenue cost of a reserve ranges from $1.74 million to $2.36
million, the largest cost being in the model without port switching. If these predic-
tions are credible, the key policy question is whether the gains in system-wide egg
production and other ecological benefits outweigh foregone harvest and hence, rev-
enue. Although costs are largest for the model without port switching, the egg
production benefits are also largest in this case. This suggests an essential tradeoff
that exists for levels of exploitation below the system’s maximum sustainable yield.
Any marine reserve will increase egg production, but these increases will be larger
for more heavily exploited systems.
Can We Find a Long-run Harvest Gain From a Marine Reserve?
The simulations in Smith and Wilen (2003) suggest that responsiveness to economic
incentives reduces the likelihood that marine reserves will pay off in terms of in-
creased harvest, compared with a model that assumes no behaviorally based policy
28 We would expect the price component of revenues to affect both southern and northern California rev-
enues similarly, so the focus is on catch per trip.Smith and Wilen 106
responsiveness. This is partly because some displaced fishermen simply switch to
adjacent patches and increase exploitation over the remaining system. When we in-
corporate more behavioral flexibility, as in table 4, divers are able to adjust to
revenue differentials more flexibly, exiting the northern California fishery as returns
decline in the long run. This increased spatial mobility removes some of the exploi-
tation pressure predicted by displaced effort in the model without port switching.
However, we were generally unable to simulate circumstances in which there was a pre-
dicted overall harvest gain with reserves under our initial model parameterizations that
reflected best available knowledge. Even with an assumed reduction in southern Cali-
fornia returns, the predicted aggregate pressure on the northern California resource
is not sufficient to give rise to a steady-state harvest increase.29
In table 5, we show the results of trying to generate a fisheries enhancement
outcome with reserves by considering different parameters reflecting dramatic
changes in the economic environment of sea urchin harvesters. Specifically, for each
model prices are doubled, and the participation rate is manipulated exogenously to
create conditions expected to be more favorable to a reserve.30 A price increase of
this magnitude could result from a demand shift for sea urchin in Japan, a change in
the U.S./Japanese exchange rate, or a combination of both.31 A large exogenous in-
crease in participation suggests that opportunities for urchin divers outside of the
urchin fishery decline substantially, reflecting possibly a major recession, the col-
lapse of other fisheries in which part-time divers participate, or both.
For these simulated re-parameterizations, the model without port switching pre-
dicts that an increase in steady-state harvest may be possible from creating a marine
reserve in patch 8. At the same time, it is not just the change in steady-state harvest
that is important; the whole time path after a reserve is created needs examination.
Figure 4 depicts the harvest paths approaching the pre-reserve steady state and the
divergence of the reserve and non-reserve paths after implementing the closure. Be-
cause the biological system takes several years to generate the first payoffs from
protecting a spawning population within a reserve, it turns out that in spite of the
long-run increase in harvest, the discounted revenues for the closure are lower than
for no closure. This reflects the fact that the biological responsiveness to a reserve is
slow relative to the economic consequences and the discount rate. With an economi-
cally driven model of diver behavior, harvesters respond immediately to a closure by
lowering their participation rates and redistributing some of their fishing effort
across the remaining open areas. The short-run consequence is lower aggregate har-
vest. Over time, stocks in the reserve rebuild and export larvae to other areas.
Eventually, when these urchins reach the minimum size limit, overall harvestable
biomass is large enough to raise catch above the pre-reserve level. But, the time that
it takes for this buildup and the consequent long period of losses leads to a negative
net present value of the policy (in revenue terms).
Because participation is much higher in the table 5 scenarios compared to those
in table 4, egg production is much lower. As a result, the egg production increase
from instituting a reserve is much higher. Egg production increases 159 billion in
29 A more extreme case would be a total collapse of the southern California fishery. We do not consider
an exogenous collapse of southern California here, but the next paragraphs consider other extreme exog-
enous shocks and their impacts on the performance of a marine reserve.
30 Shocking the participation rate simply involves increasing (or decreasing) the constant parameter in
the discrete choice model. The baseline value is the estimated coefficient of 1.055. Several different
shocks are attempted in search of a reserve scenario that increases steady-state harvest. The results in
table 5 use a value of 2.5 for the constant.
31 Reynolds and Wilen (2000) discuss the importance of the U.S./Japanese exchange rate for the price of
raw urchin in California. The authors also document demand-side conditions in Japan and general equi-
librium supply forces that can combine to produce major changes in the market for urchin roe.Marine Reserves with Endogenous Ports 107
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Economics of Marine Researves with Macroeconomic Shocks
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Notes: * Uses a 5% constant discount rate and assumes $1 per pound of sea urchin.
** Compare to participation rate of 1
1% using nested logit parameters and mean values of variables.Smith and Wilen 108
table 5 but only 125 billion in table 4. For the port switching model, we use the
same exogenous increase in participation, double prices, and also decrease southern
California catch per trip by 75%. Even under such extreme assumptions, a reserve
does not lead to a steady-state harvest increase. Again, compared to the table 4 sce-
narios, egg production is much lower with the increased participation rate.
Given the high participation rates in table 5, we have to question whether the
economic environment posited in these rather extreme simulations is even feasible.
These simulations predict that the representative diver chooses to harvest between
40% and 75% of open fishing days. Given that the largest share of open fishing days
occurs in the winter months, this simply is unrealistic. We know from the discrete
choice model that weather conditions profoundly affect the probability that harvest-
ers will fish. The simulation model incorporates estimates of diver sensitivity to bad
weather, but when we arbitrarily increase participation rates, the marginal effects of
bad weather are reduced. It seems unlikely that harvesters, even in the face of con-
siderable macroeconomic shocks, would fish on extremely dangerous days. They
may be willing to accept more physical risk from weather conditions when their
economic circumstances are desperate, but it seems unlikely that they would accept
such a dramatic increase in exposure to weather risk.
Another factor that impugns the reasonableness of these participation rates is
the physical strain of diving. Diving is a physically taxing endeavor and can have a
cumulative effect on the body over short time horizons. We observe very few divers
participating repeatedly over many days in a row. Yet, we know that weather condi-
tions can be autocorrelated, and thus, favorable weather often occurs in spells of
several consecutive days. As such, we would expect the physical strain of diving to
limit divers’ abilities to select for favorable weather days. Hence, the realities of
diving fatigue also cast doubt on the likelihood of extremely high participation
rates.
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In summary, it is difficult to find any reasonable set of circumstances under
which marine reserves will generate long-run harvest gains in the California sea ur-
chin fishery. Overexploitation that would theoretically lead to predicted harvest
gains from creating a reserve is curtailed in reality by existing management mea-
sures coupled with individual divers’ opportunity costs of fishing effort. Moreover,
the potential spatially explicit gains from a reserve are offset largely by the spatial
responsiveness of the urchin fleet.
Discussion
A marine reserve is a management tool that can contribute to multiple objectives, at
least in principle. As a means to preserve unique ecosystems, for instance, a spatial
closure is arguably unparalleled as a policy instrument. A more controversial ques-
tion is whether marine reserves can benefit commercial fisheries, and in some sense,
improve on existing management tools. A long literature on this topic has emerged
in marine biology and fisheries science that promotes using reserves to manage
commercial fishing. However, virtually all of this literature has ignored the impor-
tance of economic behavior. This paper shows that the most optimistic results are a
consequence of specialized assumptions. Incorporating a more realistic economic
model into the analysis reduces the set of scenarios in which marine reserves gener-
ate favorable outcomes.
This paper specifically assesses marine reserves when multiple spatial and tem-
poral scales of behavioral response are possible. In a recent study, Smith and Wilen
(2003) found that spatial behavior, modeled as a repeated nested logit of daily par-
ticipation and location choices, offsets the potential harvest gains from a marine
reserve in the northern California sea urchin fishery. The present analysis takes their
modeling a step farther by relaxing some restrictions of their behavioral model and
allowing for port switching activity. We find that more elastic effort response over
space and time has some important impacts on predictions from the integrated
bioeconomic model. First, some of the heterogeneity in the pre-reserve distribution
of effort is averaged out. For example, without port switching, Smith and Wilen find
that some patches are not exploited heavily because they are too costly to access. As
a result, they may play a role as de facto reserves, reducing some of the potential
gain from reserves by protecting the whole system from overexploitation. With port
switching, the attractiveness of ports and the portfolio of accessible patches off
those ports are arbitraged out by port selection behavior. Other things equal, this is
likely to distribute more initial effort and exploitation into patches that might other-
wise be calibrated with less effort with a fixed diver distribution. A second
implication of more elastic effort response associated with port and region switching
is that effort responds more quickly to post-reserve conditions. In the short run, this
will lead to even more exploitation of nearby patches that are still accessible after a
reserve is created. This reallocation mitigates some of the immediate costs of the
closure, but it ultimately puts more exploitation pressure on the parts of the system
that remain open, potentially prolonging the transition to the steady state. Overall,
we find that a model with enriched behavioral detail still reaches conclusions that
are substantially at variance with the received wisdom that has emerged from purely
biological models that depict harvester behavior as unresponsive to economic oppor-
tunities over time and space.Smith and Wilen 110
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Appendix
Elasticities with the Port Allocation Model
To compute spatial revenue elasticities, we combine the repeated nested logit prob-
abilities with the SUR share models. Recall that we denote trips as y, revenues as R,
choice occasions as o, and divers in a port as d. We index patch as j, time as t, and
port as p. Recognizing that patch-specific choice probabilities are conditional on
port, we denote these probabilities as pjt|p. The elasticity of trips to j at time t with














































To calculate (∂pjt|p)/(∂Rjt) for each port, we first note that this joint probability is the
product of the marginal patch-choice probability (pj) and the marginal participation



























Then, we use the nested logit probability expressions to find (for an own-patch rev-
enue change) (∂pGO|j)/(∂Rjt) and ∂pj/∂Rjt.
Since the discrete choice model does not contain any lagged variables, the
short- and long-run derivatives are the same. Thus, we must only find short- and
long-run expressions for ∂dpt/∂Rjt. Denoting total divers as dtot, northern California
share as sn, and port share as sp, we note first that dpt is defined as follows:
dd s s pt tot nt pt = () .  (A3)
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We can see from this expression that even though lsouth < lnorth, the long-run effects
from within northern California switching are not necessarily lower because
(∂Rnorth,t)/(∂Rjt) < (∂Rpt)/(∂Rjt).